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Abstract 
Motorists' reluctance to wear seat belts is examined in light 
of research showing (a) that protective behavior is influenced more by 
the probability of a hazard than by the magnitude of its consequences 
and (b) that people are not inclined to protect themselves voluntarily 
against very low probability threats. It is argued that the probability 
of death or injury on any single auto trip may be too low to incite 
a motorist's concern. Maintenance of a "single trip" perspective 
makes it unlikely that seat belts will be used. Change of perspective, 
towards consideration of the risks faced during a lifetime of driving, 
may increase the perceived probabilities of injury and death and, 
therefore, induce more people to wear seat belts. 
Accident Probabilities and Seat Belt Usage: 
A Psychological.Perspectivet 
P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff and S. Lichtenstein
Decision:R�se?rg�! .' A Branch of Perc�ptironics 
,_ ·Eugen;, Orego·n 97401 "�--- .. - - .:- -·..- . �-' 
1 
Research has demonstrated that seat belts effectively reduce 
injury. and death in automobile accidents [Campbell, 0 'Neill & Tingley, 
- "1974; Fhaner & Hane, 1973; Green, 1976; Hodson-Walker, 1970; Preston 
& Shortridge, 1973] and that most people are aware of this fact [Knapper, 
Cropley & Moore, 1976; Marzoni, 1971]. It is, therefore·;, perplexing 
that only a small percentage of motorists wear lap belts or shoulder 
,:··--------- - - -- - -- - ·- - ------- -- -- . --- ·-- -� 
perceived risk are reasons given for not wearing belts [Knapper, et al., 
1976� Fhan�r & Hane, 1973]. 
� _.. ,.__-'-___ __
Numerous media campaigns;:. employing the 
. - -�---. - ---
full armamentarium of "Madison Avenue," have failed to persuade people 
to "buckle up for safety" [Robertson, 1976]. 
Recently, psychologists have begun to study how people react to 
low-probability, high-consequence threats. Some of these results 
suggest reasons why motorists refuse to 'u_se seat b�lts ��i��t.-arily. 
- - - - - -- --.... ----- - -. -- --
These results and their implications ��re discussed.be�ow.-
_.,,..,...--- ----- :..--, 
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Psychological Considerations 
Over the years, as the number of vehicle miles driven per year 
in the U.S. has increased, the death rate per 10
8 
vehicle miles has 
steadily decreased, reaching a low of 3. 31 in 1976 [Accident Facts, ., 
National Safety Council, 1977]. We estimate that approximately 1 in 
every 3.5 million person trips ends in a fatal accident, and about 1 in 
every 100,000 person trips results in a disabling injury.t Thus, the 
probability of death or injury on any given trip is extremely low. Con­
sidered in the light of basic principles of learning and cognition, these 
probabilities make it unreasonable to expect people to use seat belts 
voluntarily. Figure 1 presents the rationale behind this assertion schem ... -
atically. 
Attitudes and behaviors reflect people's experience. In particular, 
it has long been known [e.g., Thorndike, 1913] that rewarded actions tend 
�,,../ - - -·---�-·-. ... · . . . -- --·-�- -- -- -� -- - -- - .. ,_ 
to be repeated while tJJ.onrewarded behavior ·diminishes. in fr�quency. �------- -· ·""''" ___ .. -- ' . . � . . � . � .. ' - .• . 
Fortt_mately, the overwhelming majority of driving experiences are accident 
free. Each safe trip rewards (reinforces) the non-use of seat s� � the 
expense of buckling up has been saved.without incurring any cost. On the 
other hand, travelers who do use belts are punished (negatively reinford1d) 
by the effort, inconvenience, and discomfort they have incurred without any 
,,,..r·· �- 'r ' --:--- .- ' • • ,,., 
-�-concrete rewa_rd. Peace of mind, usually considered the immediate tangible
......___ ·�· - .... ,/., 
reward for insuring oneself, may seem a pale compensation and one that
tour calculations of injury and fatality probabilities are based upon
the 1969 Nationwide Personal Transportation Study [U.S. Dept. of Trans­
portation], which estimated the total annual number of person trips in
passenger cars and trucks at 163,282,000,000. Traffic fatality rates
used here exclude fatalities involving pedestrians or pedal cycles. The
probability of a disabling injury (disabling beyond the day of the acci­
dent) is estimated as about 40 times higher than fatality probability, 
based on data presented in Accident Facts [National Safety Council, 1977],
EXPERIENCE: 
repeated safe trips punish 
use and reward non-use 
accidents occasionally 
happen to others 
COGNITION: 
probability of accident on 
this trip is extremely low 
effort of using seat belt 
is unlikely to be rewarded 
cost (effort} 
exceeds gain Jnon-use I 
Figure 1. Psychological Considerations in the Non-Use of Seat Belts 
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is·· .hard to enjoy while driving. Thus, . safe driving{ 'experiences.:canr.,be 
expected to lead to non-use of seat belts. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Other factors may further reduce people Is belief iri .. the 
efficacy:·.of ·buckling up: (a) the knowledge that seat belts are not 100%
effective [Fhaner & Hane, 1974]; (b) drivers' tendencies to view vehicle 
risks as unde� !J1.eir control [Fischhoff; Slovic, 
�- ' - -
{ . �·-...- -- . -·- - -
and Combs,\in press], coupled with the fact that 
Lichtenstein, Read 
- - ---" ..
perceived control pr0duces 
exaggerated feeiings of confidence [Langer, 1975); and (c) the fact that 
_,-,,,--,.,, ,- --- -- - .. --- ,�-·� - ---- -- - --- .---- - -- - --�,. ---- ·75% t6 90% of ,!the drivers in various CO\lntries conside·r themselves· 1?o --�----
------. ·-- --- ---- ---- - ----·---
' be better· than average [Svenson, 1977]. We do occasionally see or ·-- ---- ---- ... ----- ---- � - .__::...:-:..::.: ------
read about ac�idents, but the victims are other people. 
-- -- -- - . 
The failure to use seat belts surprises us because of the extremely 
high value people place on the.ir lives. Even a very small. probability 
of saving one's life or avoiding serious injury should make the expected 
gain from using a seat belt exceed the costs. Such reasoning assumes 
that people have the'.uri.lirii.ited time, energy and attentional capacities 
needed to have an.infinite reservoir of concern. In fact, however, there 
are only so many things people can worry about arid protect themselves 
against. Unless many hazards are ignored, obsessive preoccupation with 
risk would preclude any sort of productive life. 
When choosing which life-threatening events to ignore, those with 
probabilities near zero are obvious··.candidates. Indeed, there are many 
,· ' ,s,• . 
threats /that. we routinely ignore in order to go on with _the business 
of living: elevators falling, dams bursting, televisions exploding, etc. 
4� 
For many people, auto accidents may seem so improbable that they fail 
.- ---- - ___ -J-- ------t· .,,
tof irtC:i:t(;�c_ciJ16ern. . · 
. --------- _---...,' _._:;;.- .. - - ·-
Insurance Behavior: Supporting Evidence 
.,r::--. - - . •- ' -.. -
An instructive analog', �-o�!h�_ 1?ea�:-_b�
-
�E problem can�_b:._ �����--�-
n
another type of protective activity: buying insurance. People's 
resistance to purchasing insurance is well known. Consider; for example, 
the following testimony by George Bernstein, then Federal Insurance 
Administrator, before a U.S. Senate subcommittee: 
---- - - •.;co-- -�-�-
• • • most property '9:WU�E-13 ·S],J:Ilply - do _not_ buy ·insur
-
ance ·
- r 
-
-- - - · - . -·  -- -- .. -----
voluntarily, regardless of the amount of equity they have at 
stake. It was not until banks and other lending institutions 
united in requiring fire insurance from their mortgagers that 
most people got around to purchasing. it .•. and we just need 
look at our automobile··.insurance laws to recognize that unless 
we force ·.that insurance down the throats of the drivers, many, 
many thousands of people would be unprotected on the highways. 
People-do not buy insurance voluntarily unless there is 
. .-.. -- ___ ; -\. -;·- ... --- ---- . -- --- ---- __ .... 
pressure on them from one source}or a11.other-d.Bernst-ein, :.197.Z;·p. 23:J. 
·- -.. "'" - ·:· , ..... � -- -- -- - . . - . --
Efforts by the government and private companies to induce people 
to insure their property against earthquakes and flood damage have 
been spectacularly unsuccessful [Anderson, 1974], much like the seat-
r . 
belt campaigns. Even strong economic ,incentives, such as 90% premium 
I •  
subsidies�- _:_have not stimulated flood insurance sales. 
··i" There are, of course, some unlikely hazards to which people react
quite strongly, nuclear reactor accidents being a prime example. We
believe this r_eaction occurs because critics perceive the probat,Jlity
of a catastrQRhic accident to be quite high. iPeople have
r
�o -firsthlind 
'--�p-e�'::teiice:.wi{l_l (the safety of) nuclear power; .. instead,-
-
fney mffst rely
ontRe::new;s::Jlledi;=i._ which typically pay �re_ilttention to:·�_;akdo.;.;;§-=�'..- ---­
and :,potential a<;:cidents-than"'fo ;the :successful day.:.fo.:.:day <iperations of 
power- plant��---- -- . -- - - -· --. - - --
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Concern about the viability of insurance as a mechanism for coping 
with risks from natural hazards has led to .several recent field surveys 
and laboratory studies of insurance decision making [Kunreuther, Ginsberg, 
.. -"':-.. ___ ,, 
Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Borkin & Katz,(1978; ':/schoemaker, 1977; Slovic, 
\......'�-.,._......---... 
Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, 1977]. One robust finding 
from this research has been that people are more willing to insure against 
small losses with relatively high probabilities than against large but 
unlike;J:y losses. Table 1 illustrates this effect with data from an 
experiment performed by Slovic, et al. [1977] in which people played 
an elaborate farm management game. One of their many decisions was 
whether or.not to insure against each of five natural hazards. The prob­
ability of occurrence of these hazards ranged from .002 to .25. The 
magnitude of loss varied inversely with the probability of occurrence 
such that the expected loss (i.e., probability multiplied by loss) was 
the same for each. Premiums were set slightly above the expected loss. 
As the table shows, people were much more likely to insure against 
1,---------:-------- ------�---··"""'-·------- >--·-... 4 __ ,.,,.. .. t:r-__....:...-�--�-�·" .,,
"-
,.--------� 
reiativeiy h::lgh�probability, low-loss· hazards· than against· low:-'probability, 
high-loss hazards. This behavior, which has also been obtained in.other 
experiments, runs c·ounter·· to that postulated by· the traditional. economic 
theories of insurance [e.g., Friedman & Savage, 1948]. Those theories 
assume that people wish to protect themselves against rare, catastrophic 
losses that they could not bear themselves. Outside the laboratory, 
the popularity of low-deductible insurance plans O [Fuchs, 1976; Pashigi1;n," 
Schkade& Menefee, 1966] which offer expensive coverage·for·small, 
but.likely, losses is consistent with results from the experiments. -------------· -----------
Insert Table 1 about here 
•• - ··--
I 
Table 1 
Effect of Probability of Loss on Insurance Purchase Decisions in a
Probability 
of Loss 
.002 
.01 
.05 
.10 
.25 
a. Farm Management Game 
. Magnitude Insurance 
of Loss Premium 
. $247,500 
b
$500 
49,500 500 
9,900 500 
4,950 500 
1,980 500 
Percent of 
Persons Insuring 
.33 
45 
52 
49 
73 
a
Taken from S16vic, Fischhoff,'Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, 1977.
bA.loss of this magnitude would cost the individual the farm ..
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Two considerations seem to dominate these insurance decisions, both 
inside and outside the laboratory. One is the disinclination to worry 
about (!�aiilit·y-�;d_s, · �jh;-s��;����-s_.a __ p;� -��� ��- y_ie�· � ,_ · _ . 
. . ---�--· ---- -- -
insurance as an investment. Insuring. against probable losses increases 
the probability of making a claim and getting something tangible for 
one's premium dollars. 
Implications 
Given these results, we might expect that many motorists would 
find it irrational to bear the costs (however slight) of buckling up 
in return for partial protection against an overwhelmingly unlikely 
accident. On the other hand, public safety officials, who must consider 
an entire population of drivers taking many trips, view the problem 
quite differently. Whereas the probability 6£ seat belt usage being 
beneficial on any one trip is miniscule, any increment in the percentage 
of trips on which seat belts are worn is certain to save many lives 
and prevent many injuries. Such differing perspectives may trigger 
much of the conflict and mutual frustration between public officials 
and motorists, each believing (with some justice) that their analysis 
of the situation is correct. 
It follows from the psychological considerations described above 
that appeals based on either the efficacy of seat belts (in the event 
of an accident) or lurid descriptions of accidents will be ineffective 
unless they somehow raise the perceived probability of accidents. Indeed, 
such appeals have not worked in practice [e.g., Robertson,\Kelley, �-'Neill, 
Wixom, Elswirth & Haddon, 1974]. As long as accidents are viewed as ·· 
7 
virtually impossible, efficacy and damage mean little. In his review 
of fifteen years of research on fear arousal and the failure of threat 
appeals, Higbee [1969] reached a similar conclusion. He noted: 
"The severity of the consequences (threat level) and the i.-----------,--------------�--r---""'�----- . ' --- . __ _ .. - --·�--�- ·-------··""'"""---"' 
probability of their occurrence may be negatively related. Thus, 
a highly threatening consequence (e.g., paralysis or blindness) 
may not be seen as too likely to result from not brushing one's 
teeth, whereas,it may be seen as more likely that not brushing 
one's teeth could lead to cavities. If such a negative relation­
ship exists, then increases in fear level could lead to decreases 
in perceived probability of occurrence of the threat and thus to 
decreased persuasiveness" [p. 440 ]. 
Our analysis suggests that voluntary use of seat belts depends 
· on motorists believing that their personal likelihood of being in an
accident is high enough to make wearing a belt sensible. As long as
the chances of accident on any given trip remain miniscule, the only
hope may be· to get people to think about··the risks faced 9ver-a._lifetime� . - - . .
of driving.\. The 1969 Nationwide Personal Transportation Study indicates
that the average U.S. citizen makes about 800 automobile trips per
year. This suggests that the probability of a fatal accident sometime
within a fifty year period of driving (40, 000 trips) is about . 01,
while the probability of experiencing at least one disabling injury is
t 
about .33. Perhaps presentation of these probabilities, along with the
tThese probabilities were based on assumed rates of one fatality per 3.5
million trips and one disabling injury per 100, 000 trips combined with
· the assumption that these events are randomly and independently distributed.
Given these assumptions, the probability of experiencing a fatality in
40, 000 trips is 1 - [1 -1/3�500, 000]
40, 000 and the probability of experi-
�ricitig one or more disabl�n;·accidents in 40, 000 trips is 1 - [1 - 1/100, 000]
40, 000
.
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admonition that "no one knows when that accident will come," might 
trigger concern and increase the use of seat belts. 
In our laboratory experiments, we found that people could be 
induced to purchase insurance against rare threats by lengthening 
their t:ime perspective [Slovic, et,al., 1977]. Supporting evidence 
more germane to seat belts comes from an exploratory study we recently 
conducted. The participants in this study were 38 men and 41 women 
who responded to an advertisement placed in the University of Oregon 
newspaper. Most were students; their range of ages was 17-50 years, 
with a median of 21 years. Participants were assigned randomly to one 
of two groups. One group was given the probabilities of death and 
injury per single trip along with the following statement: 
-----� ... ,..,,a, .� ••. --�-
"Because the probability that any particular automobile trip 
wilL,end in death or serious injury is so very small, the 
wearing of seat belts is just not necessary. · -Any effort or 
inconvenience involved in wearing seat belts, however slight, 
is unlikely to be repaid." 
· The second group was given the probabilities of death and injury in
the course-of-40;000 trips. They were then told:
"Because these probabilities of death or serious injury are 
so high, the wearing of seat belts is quite :important. Any 
effort or inconvenience involved in wearing seat belts is 
likely to be repaid." 
--
After being exposed to the single trip or lifetime (40,000 trips) statistics 
and the statements that accompanied them, both groups were asked 
several questions about the likely :impact of this information on their 
use of seat belts and their attitude towards enactment of laws �equiring 
9 
the use of some sort of protection, either wearing of seat belts or 
installation of air bags. 
Prior to presenting any information about accident probabilities, 
we examined our participants' opinions about the effectiveness of seat 
belts. We also asked them to indicate the frequency with which they 
wore seat belts. There were no differences between the two groups on 
either of these measures. However, differences between groups did 
appear after the statistics were presented. ,:f�;-respo�dents (4 
. . - ·- - " -·- ·- --- ---- -
out of 41) believed their use of seat belts would be changed as a result 
of exposure to the single-trip statistics, but 39% of those exposed to 
the lifetime probabilities said they expected their use of seat belts 
to increase because of this·information. Whereas 54% of the persons who 
received single-trip information favored mandatory protection, 78% of 
those exposed to lifetime statistics faV,ored such a law. Participants 
in both groups were later shown both single-trip and lifetime information 
accompanied by the respective anti- and pro-seat belt statements. When 
asked to compare the statements and indicate which was more convincing, 
80% of the participants selected the pro-seat belt argument based on the 
probabilities over the course of 40,000 trips. 
While this study is promising, we have no assurance that the 
favorable attitudes towards seat belts engendered by a lengthened 
time perspective will be maintained and translated into behavior, 
especially in light of people's repeated safe experiences with automo­
bile trips. If a favorable perspective cannot be maintained, public 
safety officials will have to reassess the problem. Strictly enforced 
10 
legislation requiring seat belts ·[;e.g., Freedman, Wood & Henderson; 
1974] or passive devices such as air bags may be the only way to 
ensure that the majority of motorists are adequately protected. 
Conclusion 
The small probability of accidents, continually reinforced by 
safe expet'.i:.ences, in conjunction with people's limited capability to 
attend to rare threats, helps explain the non-use of seat belts. 
While this perspective on the problem indicates one approach towards 
increasing voluntary use of seat belts, it also suggests that there 
is an element of rationality in people's behavior that may keep 
voluntary use at its current low rate. 
\f 
I 
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